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2014 National Environmental Moot Court 
Competition Problem 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE TWELFTH CIRCUIT 
—————————————--—— 
JACQUES BONHOMME,           )          
Plaintiff-Appellant,                    ) 
Cross-Appellee,                            ) 
 v.                                                  ) 
SHIFTY MALEAU,                       ) 
Defendant-Appellant,                 ) 
Cross-Appellee.                             ) 
———————————————-- )            C.A. No. 13-01234 
STATE OF PROGRESS,             )            ORDER 
Plaintiff-Appellant,                    ) 
Cross-Appellee,                            )  
and                                                 ) 
SHIFTY MALEAU,                       ) 
Intervenor-Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 
Cross-Appellee,                             ) 
 v.                                                  ) 
JACQUES BONHOMME,            ) 
Defendant-Appellant,                  ) 
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APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT 
COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PROGRESS 
NOS. 155-CV-2012 & 165-CV-20121 
Following the issuance of the Order of the District Court 
dated July 23, 2012 in D.C. No. 155-CV-2012 and D.C. No. 165-
CV-2012, Jacques Bonhomme (Bonhomme), the State of Progress 
(Progress) and Shifty Maleau (Maleau) each filed a Notice of 
Appeal.  Bonhomme takes issue with the decision of the lower 
court with respect to its holding that: Bonhomme is not a real 
party in interest contrary to FRCP 17 because he is a front for 
Precious Metals International; Bonhomme is not a “citizen” 
entitled to file a citizen suit under Clean Water Act (CWA) § 505, 
33 U.S.C. § 1365, because he is a foreign national; Maleau’s 
mining waste piles are not “point sources” under CWA§502(12), 
(14), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12), (14), because piles are not 
conveyances; Ditch C-1 is not a navigable water because it is a 
point source; and Bonhomme violates the CWA by allowing 
pollutants added by Maleau to flow into Reedy Creek through his 
culvert – a “point source” – because Maleau first adds the 
pollutants to navigable water via Ditch C-1.  Maleau takes issue 
with the decision of the lower court with respect to its holding 
that Reedy Creek is a water of the United States under CWA § 
502(7), (12), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7), (12), because it does not fit the 
traditional understanding of “navigable waters,” the 
jurisdictional term in the statute, CWA §502(7), 33 U.S.C. § 
1362(7).  Progress takes issue with the decision of the lower court 
with respect to its holding that Ditch C-1 is not a water of the 
United States because it does not fit the traditional 
understanding of “navigable waters,” the jurisdictional term in 
the statute, CWA § 502(7), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7). 
Therefore, it is hereby ordered that the parties brief all of the 
following issues: 
1. Whether Bonhomme is the real party in interest under 
FRCP 17 to bring suit against Maleau for violating § 301(a) of the 
                                                 
1 Grayed our & italicized text denotes an addition, deletion, or change from the 
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CWA, 33 U.S.C. §1311 (a).  [Bonhomme argues that he is the real 
party in interest under FRCP 17 and that the court below erred 
in granting Progress’ and Maleau’s motion to dismiss on this 
issue.  Progress and Maleau argue that Precious Metals 
International is the real party in interest under FRCP 17 and 
that the court below did not err in granting their motion to 
dismiss on this issue.] 
2. Whether Bonhomme – a foreign national – is a “citizen” 
under CWA § 505, 33 U.S.C. 1365, who may bring suit against 
Maleau.  [Bonhomme argues that he is a “citizen” as defined in 
CWA §§ 505(g), 502(5), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1365(g), 1362(5), and that the 
court below erred in granting Progress’ and Maleau’s motion to 
dismiss on this issue.  Progress and Maleau argue that 
Bonhomme is not a “citizen” under CWA §§ 505(g), 502(5), 33 
U.S.C. §§ 1365(g), 1362(5), because he is a foreign national and 
that the court below did not err in granting their motion to 
dismiss on that issue.] 
3.  Whether Maleau’s mining waste piles are “point sources” 
under CWA § 502(12), (14), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12), (14).  
[Bonhomme argues that they are point sources under § 502(12), 
(14), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12), (14) and that the court below erred in 
granting Progress’ and Maleau’s motion to dismiss on this issue.  
Progress and Maleau argue that the waste piles are not “point 
sources” under § 502(12), (14), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12), (14), and that 
the court below did not err in granting their motion to dismiss on 
that issue.] 
4.  Whether Ditch C-1 is a “navigable water/water of the 
United States” under CWA § 502(7), (12), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7), 
(14).  [Bonhomme and Progress argue the Ditch is a “navigable 
water/water of the United States” under CWA § 502(7), (12), 33 
U.S.C. § 1362(7), (14), and that the court below erred in granting 
Maleau’s motion to dismiss on this issue.  Maleau argues that the 
Ditch is not a “navigable water/water of the United States” under 
CWA § 502(7), (12), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12), (14), and that the court 
below did not err in granting his motion to dismiss on this issue.] 
5.  Whether Reedy Creek is a “navigable water/water of the 
United States” under CWA § 502(7), (12), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7), 
(12).  [Bonhomme and Progress argue that Reedy Creek is a 
“navigable water/water of the United States” under CWA § 
3
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502(7), (12), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7), (12), and that the court below 
did not err in finding against Maleau on this issue.  Maleau 
argues that Reedy Creek is not a “navigable water/water of the 
United States under CWA § 502(7), (12), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7), (12), 
and that the court below erred in finding for Bonhomme on this 
issue.] 
6.  Whether Bonhomme violates the CWA by adding arsenic 
to Reedy Creek through a culvert on his property even if Maleau 
is the but-for cause of the presence of arsenic in Ditch C-1.  
[Bonhomme argues that he does not violate the CWA because 
Maleau indirectly adds arsenic to Ditch C-1 via his waste piles 
and that the court below erred in denying his motion to dismiss 
on this issue.  Progress and Maleau argue that Bonhomme is 
liable regardless of who added the arsenic to Ditch C-1 because he 
owns the culvert/point source discharging the pollutant into 
Reedy Creek and that the court below did not err in denying 
Bonhomme’s motion to dismiss on this issue.] 
 
  SO ORDERED. 
 Entered this 14th Day of September, 2013 
 
[NOTE: No decisions decided or documents dated after September 
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PROGRESS 
—————————————--) 
JACQUES BONHOMME,   ) 
Plaintiff,                               ) 
 v.                                          ) 
SHIFTY MALEAU,               ) 
Defendant.                            )  
—————————————--)      155-CV-2012, 165-CV-2012 
STATE OF PROGRESS,     )      OPINION AND ORDER 
Plaintiff,                               ) 
and                                         ) 
SHIFTY MALEAU,               ) 
Plaintiff-Intervenor,            ) 
 v.                                           ) 
JACQUES BONHOMME,    )  
Defendant.                              ) 
——————————————) 
CONSOLIDATED CASES 
ROMULUS N. REMUS, United States District Judge: 
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
After proper notice, Jacques Bonhomme sued Shifty Maleau 
for violating the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 
(2012), under the jurisdiction of the citizen suit provision of that 
statute, CWA § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365. Bonhomme requested all of 
the relief available under § 1365.  Bonhomme alleges that Maleau 
has piled gold mining overburden, waste rock, and dirt adjacent 
to Ditch C-1 (or “the Ditch”) in Jefferson County, State of 
Progress, and continues to do so.  Bonhomme alleges that Maleau 
arranged these mining waste piles in such a configuration that 
stormwater runoff from the piles has eroded channels between 
the intersections of the piles and between the piles’ intersections 
with Ditch C-1, and adds arsenic in rainwater runoff to Ditch C-1 
through those channels.  Finally, Bonhomme alleges that the 
USDC DP 
Electronically Filed 
Date Filed: July 23, 2012 
5
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Ditch carries the arsenic through a culvert under his farm road to 
discharge into Reedy Creek (or “the Reedy” or “the Creek”), an 
interstate, navigable water.  Bonhomme asserts that the Ditch is 
a navigable water under EPA regulations because it is a tributary 
of Reedy Creek, an interstate, navigable water. 
Later, after proper notice, the State of Progress filed a citizen 
suit against Bonhomme alleging that he violated the CWA by 
discharging arsenic from his culvert – a point source – into Reedy 
Creek.  Maleau intervened as a matter of right in Progress’s 
action against Bonhomme under CWA § 505(b)(1)(B).  Progress 
and Maleau moved to consolidate their case with Bonhomme v. 
Maleau because the facts and law are the same.  Bonhomme did 
not object to this motion.  This Court granted the motion to 
consolidate. The defendant in each suit filed motions to dismiss. 
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
The two very long and detailed complaints contain the 
following factual allegations. Maleau operates an open pit gold 
mining and extraction operation adjacent to the traditionally 
navigable Buena Vista River in Progress.  The Buena Vista River 
maintains water flow throughout the year.  Maleau’s mining 
operations require CWA permits; there is no evidence in the 
record that he is in violation of these permits.  He trucks the 
overburden and slag from that operation on his property in 
Lincoln County, Progress and places it in piles adjacent to Ditch 
C-1 in Jefferson County, Progress.  Maleau’s property in Jefferson 
County is not used for agricultural purposes.  When it rains, 
rainwater runoff flows down the piles and percolates through 
them, eventually discharging through channels eroded by gravity 
from the configuration of the waste piles into Ditch C-1, leaching 
and carrying arsenic from the piles into the water in the Ditch.  
Ditch C-1 is a drainage ditch dug into saturated soils to drain 
them sufficiently for agricultural use.  Ditch C-1 is 3’ across and 
1’ foot deep on average.  It was constructed in 1913 by an 
association of landowners, including the predecessors in interest 
of Bonhomme and Maleau.  Restrictive covenants in their deeds 
require them to maintain the Ditch on their properties.  Ditch C-1 
begins before Maleau’s property line.  The Ditch contains running 
water except during annual periods of drought lasting from 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol5/iss1/1
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several weeks to three months.  The water in the Ditch is derived 
primarily from draining groundwater from the saturated soil, 
with some rainwater runoff after rain events.  From Maleau’s 
property line, Ditch C-1 runs three miles through several 
agricultural properties, which it still drains, before it crosses into 
Bonhomme’s property and discharges through a culvert 
underneath a farm road on Bonhomme’s property directly into 
Reedy Creek. All of the properties that Ditch C-1 runs through, 
including Bonhomme’s and Maleau’s, lie in Progress and none are 
uplands. 
Reedy Creek is about fifty miles long and maintains water 
flow throughout the year. It begins in the State of New Union 
where it is used as the water supply for Bounty Plaza, a service 
area on Interstate 250 (“I-250”) selling gasoline and food.  I-250 is 
a federally-funded, east-west interstate highway.  In both states, 
farmers whose land adjoins the Creek divert the water for 
agricultural purposes, primarily irrigation.  They sell their 
agricultural products in interstate commerce.  Just before 
reaching Bonhomme’s property, Reedy Creek flows into the State 
of Progress, where it flows for several miles before ending in 
Wildman Marsh.  Wildman is an extensive wetlands and a 
stopover essential to over a million ducks and other waterfowl 
during their twice annual migrations from  
the Arctic to the tropics and back.  Much of the wetlands is 
contained within the Wildman National Wildlife Refuge, which is 
owned and maintained by the United States Fish and Wildlife 
Service. The area is a major destination for duck hunters from 
Progress, New Union and five neighboring states.  It attracts 
hunters from around the nation and even a few foreign countries.  
Hunting there is acknowledged to add over $25 million to the 
local economy from interstate hunters.  Bonhomme’s property 
fronts part of the wetlands, and he has used it, along with his 
large hunting lodge, for hunting parties in the past (primarily for 
duck hunting activities) with his business and social friends and 
acquaintances.  The hunting lodge sits on his property on the 
edge of the marsh near the point where the creek flows into the 
marsh. 
Before suing Maleau, Bonhomme tested the water in Ditch C-
1 both upstream and downstream of Maleau’s property and the 
7
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water in the Reedy both upstream and downstream of the outflow 
of Ditch C-1.  None of the samples were taken on Maleau’s 
property.  Upstream of the Maleau property, arsenic is 
undetectable in Ditch C-1.  Just below the Maleau property, 
arsenic is present in Ditch C-1 in high concentrations.  As Ditch 
C-1 flows from the Maleau property toward Reedy Creek, the 
concentration of arsenic decreases in proportion to the increasing 
flow in the Ditch.  In Reedy Creek above the discharge from Ditch 
C-1, arsenic is undetectable.  However, just below the discharge 
of Ditch C-1 into Reedy Creek, arsenic is present in the Creek in 
significant concentrations.  Arsenic is also detectable at lower 
levels throughout Wildman Marsh.  Arsenic is commonly 
associated with gold mining and extraction and is a well-known 
poison.  This alleged pattern of arsenic concentration, if proven, 
strongly suggests the arsenic in Reedy Creek and Wildman 
Marsh originates from Maleau’s mining waste piles.  These 
alleged facts are assumed to be true at the motion to dismiss 
stage.  But they must be proven at trial.  Speculation of other 
origins of the arsenic in Reedy Creek and Wildman Marsh are 
irrelevant at this stage of the proceeding.  There have been no 
notable changes in the flora and fauna surrounding the hunting 
lodge as a result of arsenic; however, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service has detected arsenic in three Blue-winged Teal in 
Wildman Marsh. 
Bonhomme alleges that arsenic fouls the waters of Reedy 
Creek, Wildman Marsh, and wildlife residing in or visiting the 
marsh sufficiently that he is afraid to continue to use the marsh 
for his hunting parties.  He has decreased his hunting parties 
from eight a year to two a year.  Maleau does not contest these 
allegations except to suggest that the decrease in Bonhomme’s 
hunting parties is more likely a result of the general decline of 
the economy over the last few years, a decline mirrored by 
declining profits of Precious Metals International, Inc. (or “PMI”), 
for whose benefit those parties have been held. PMI is 
incorporated in Delaware and headquartered in New York City. 
The Court takes judicial notice that the Attorney General of 
Progress held a press conference when he filed suit saying that 
the state was acting in its prosecutorial discretion to protect both 
the waters of the state, including Wildman Marsh, and Maleau, a 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol5/iss1/1
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citizen of the state and one of the region’s largest employers.  
According to the Attorney General, Bonhomme, as President of 
PMI, filed suit against Maleau to injure his ability to compete 
with PMI.  The Court also takes judicial notice that, at his own 
press conference, Bonhomme accused the Progress Attorney 
General of political payback to Maleau, filing suit against 
Bonhomme in return for major contributions that Maleau gave to 
the Attorney General’s election campaign.  Bonhomme accused 
Maleau of being an unfair business competitor, artificially 
lowering his cost of production by ignoring environmental 
protection requirements, and hiring undocumented aliens  
at minimum wage and housing them in abandoned chicken coops.  
The chicken coops are on his Lincoln County property.  
Bonhomme further accused Maleau of trucking dirt and rock fifty 
miles from his gold mining operation in Progress adjacent to the 
Buena Vista River, long held to be a navigable water.  Bonhomme 
alleged that if Maleau left his mining wastes adjacent to the 
traditionally navigable Buena Vista River, runoff from his waste 
piles would be carried to the Buena Vista, clearly requiring a 
CWA permit.  Bonhomme accused Maleau of moving the piles 
adjacent to Ditch C-1, a lesser water, in hopes of avoiding the 
water pollution abatement requirements. 
III. PROCEDURAL AND LEGAL ISSUES 
The first issue raised by Maleau is that Bonhomme is not a 
proper plaintiff, both because he is not the real party in interest 
and because he is not a citizen of the United States.  Another 
issue raised by Maleau is that Maleau could not violate CWA § 
301(a), 33 U.S.C. §1311(a) by adding a pollutant to navigable 
waters from a point source unauthorized by a CWA permit, 
because Maleau’s waste piles are not point sources and the 
waters involved are not navigable waters.  Bonhomme and 
Progress both argue that Ditch C-1 and Reedy Creek are 
navigable waters/waters of the United States and subject to the 
jurisdiction of the CWA.  Although (1) Bonhomme’s ability to be a 
plaintiff in the case, (2) whether Maleau’s waste piles are point 
sources, and (3) whether Ditch C-1 is navigable were not part of 
Progress’s cause of action against Bonhomme, Progress filed 
briefs supporting Maleau on the first two issues and supporting 
9
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Bonhomme on the third issue in an effort to expand the state’s 
CWA jurisdiction while protecting their citizen, Maleau.  As for 
the last issue, Bonhomme argues that he cannot be liable for the 
discharge of arsenic from Ditch C-1 through the culvert under 
Bonhomme’s farm road to Reedy Creek because he did not add 
arsenic to the water in Ditch C-1.  Maleau argues that he is not 
liable in Bonhomme’s suit because neither Ditch C-1 nor Reedy 
Creek are navigable, but if the court holds that Reedy Creek is a 
water of the United States, he argues in the alternative along 
with Progress that Bonhomme is the one liable for the discharge 
of arsenic into Reedy Creek. 
A. Procedural Issues 
Maleau alleges that Bonhomme cannot maintain his suit 
under Rule 17(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because 
he is not the real party in interest. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 17(a).  
Maleau first raised this issue in his answer to Bonhomme’s 
complaint, providing Bonhomme and PMI (not a party to the 
action) an opportunity to correct their pleadings by adding PMI 
as a party, which they have not done.  In addition to being 
President of the company, Bonhomme is a 3% shareholder in PMI 
(the largest shareholder) and is also on the Board of Directors of 
PMI.  There are seven members on the Board.  PMI owns five 
gold mines around the world, including two in the United States. 
The company has no mines in either Progress or New Union.  It is 
in direct competition with Maleau and his mining business.  PMI 
conducted or paid for the sampling and analyses to support 
Bonhomme’s contention that the arsenic in Reedy Creek and 
Wildman Marsh comes from Maleau.  PMI pays the attorney and 
expert witness fees for Bonhomme in this case.  Bonhomme does 
not live at his lodge adjacent to Wildman Marsh but uses it only 
for hunting parties composed primarily of business clients and 
associates of PMI.  PMI cannot maintain this suit by buying a 
plaintiff.  Because PMI rather than Bonhomme is the real party 
in interest but is not the plaintiff, Bonhomme’s suit is dismissed. 
As if this were not enough, Bonhomme is a French national, 
not a citizen of the United States.  Section 505 of the CWA is 
entitled “Citizen Suits” and authorizes “any citizen” to maintain 
suit against violations of the statute. 33 U.S.C. § 1365.  It is true, 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol5/iss1/1
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as Bonhomme points out, that section 505(g) defines “citizen” to 
mean “a person or persons having an interest which is or may be 
adversely affected” and section 502(5) defines “person” to mean 
individuals, corporations, partnerships, government entities, etc. 
33 U.S.C. §§ 1365(g), 1362(5).  Bonhomme argues that “citizen” 
therefore means persons, individuals, and various entities 
without regard to nationality.  On the other hand the CWA, 
including sections 505(g) and 502(5), does not expressly authorize 
foreign nationals to commence citizen suits.  The Supreme Court 
has held that by defining the narrow phrase “navigable waters” 
as the arguably broader concept of “waters of the United States,” 
section 502(7), Congress did not deprive the term “navigable” of 
all meaning.  Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty v. U. S. Army 
Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 172 (2001); 33 U.S.C. § 1362.  
Similarly, the CWA’s definition of the narrow concept of a 
“citizen” of the United States as the broader concept of a “person,” 
does not deprive “citizen” of its meaning.  Indeed, from the 
specification of the various entities in the definition of “person,” it 
is evident that Congress intended to broaden potential citizen 
suit plaintiffs beyond individuals, rather than beyond citizens of 
American nationality.  Of course, Progress is not a “citizen” of the 
United States either.  But it is at least a domestic entity.  In any 
event, Bonhomme has not challenged Progress’ ability to bring its 
cause of action on that basis. 
It might be thought that Maleau must give notice of a citizen 
suit prior to intervening in Progress’ citizen suit against 
Bonhomme.  However, CWA § 505(b) contains no such 
requirement. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b).  In any event, Progress did not 
challenge Maleau’s intervention on that ground and Bonhomme 
does not challenge Maleau’s presence in these consolidated cases 
on that ground. 
B. CWA Legal Issues 
The Clean Water Act prohibits the discharge of pollutants 
except in compliance with CWA permits. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a).  
The “discharge of a pollutant” is defined as “any addition of any 
pollutant to navigable waters from a point source.” 33 U.S.C. § 
1362(12).  It is undisputed that arsenic is a pollutant.  Beyond 
11
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that, the parties’ views of the facts and of the statute differ 
markedly. 
Bonhomme alleges that Maleau’s overburden and slag piles 
are point sources, citing Sierra Club v. Abston Const. Co, 620 
F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1980).  EPA’s regulations define “waters of the 
United States” to include tributaries of navigable waters. 40 
C.F.R. § 122.2 (2013).  Bonhomme alleges that Reedy Creek is a 
navigable water, that Ditch C-1 is a tributary of Reedy Creek, 
and that Ditch C-1 is therefore also a navigable water.  Maleau 
responds that overburden piles are not point sources, citing 
Consolidated Coal Co. v. Costle, 604 F.2d 239, 249 (4th Cir. 1979) 
and Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 545 F.2d 1351, 1373 (4th 
Cir. 1976), because a pile of dirt and stone is not a “discernible, 
confined and discrete conveyance,” which is the CWA’s definition 
of “point source,” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14).  Indeed, that definition 
lists a dozen examples of point sources and none of them remotely 
resemble a pile of dirt and stone.  Piles are not normally 
considered to be conveyances. 
Maleau also argues that Ditch C-1 is not navigable water 
because it has never floated a boat and is too small to do so in the 
future.  Moreover, ditches are listed as point sources in CWA 
502(14), and a ditch cannot be simultaneously two elements in 
the water pollution offense.  Although Bonhomme and Progress 
contest this, Maleau has definitive precedent on his side, Rapanos 
v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 735-36 (2006). Since Ditch C-1 is a 
point source, it cannot be a navigable water. 
Indeed, Progress and Maleau in their cause of action allege 
that if anyone violates the CWA in this factual situation, it is 
Bonhomme, because Bonhomme owns the culvert from which 
Ditch C-1 discharges the arsenic into Reedy Creek.  Culverts are 
well established to be point sources, Dague v. Burlington, 935 
F.2d 1343, 13154-55 (2d Cir. 1991), rev’d on other grounds, 505 
U.S. 557 (1992), and the Supreme Court has held that the owners 
of point sources do not have to initially add pollutants to water to 
be liable under the CWA as long as their point sources convey the 
pollutants to navigable waters.  South Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 
541 U.S. 95 at 105.  Assuming that Reedy Creek is navigable 
water, that is just what Bonhomme’s culvert does.  However, 
Bonhomme argues that Maleau’s actions are the but-for cause of 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol5/iss1/1
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adding arsenic to Reedy Creek and that if Maleau did not add 
arsenic directly from his waste piles to a tributary of Reed Creek, 
he added it indirectly to Reedy Creek through Bonhomme’s 
culvert.  The CWA and the Environmental Protection Agency, 
however, do not define “discharge” or “addition” in terms of 
causation, direct addition or indirect addition.  Instead, it 
prohibits the addition of arsenic from a culvert to Reedy Creek; it 
prohibits Bonhomme’s actions, not Maleau’s actions. See 33 
U.S.C. § 1311. 
That brings us to the question of whether Reedy Creek is 
navigable water, a pivotal issue in both causes of action.  No one 
alleges that Reedy Creek is or ever has been used for waterborne 
transportation or could be so used with reasonable improvements, 
the traditional definition of navigable waters. United States v. 
Appalachian Electric Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940).  Bonhomme 
and Progress argue, however, that Reedy Creek is used as a 
water supply for interstate travelers on I-250, making it 
necessary for interstate commerce.  They also point out that 
Wildman Marsh, the terminus of Reedy Creek, is necessary for 
the interstate migration of birds, supporting interstate commerce 
in duck hunting.  EPA’s definition of “waters of the United 
States” includes waters used in interstate commerce. 40 C.F.R. § 
122.2.  Of course, the Supreme Court rejected that argument in 
Rapanos, ruling that rivers must be highways of interstate 
commerce to fall within the definition of “navigable waters” under 
the CWA.  In essence it ruled that to fall within Commerce 
Clause jurisdiction, a waterway must be within the first prong of 
U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), rather than within the second 
or third prongs of Lopez jurisdiction, as Bonhomme and Progress 
argue.  They argue that Reedy Creek and its uses are almost 
identical to those of the Rito Seco Creek in Colorado, which the 
Tenth Circuit held to be navigable in U.S. v. Earth Sciences, Inc., 
599 F.2d 368 (10th Cir. 1979).  However, Earth Sciences was a 
pre-Rapanos decision and is no longer good law.  Nevertheless, 
Bonhomme and Progress argue that Reedy Creek is a water of 
the United States because it is an interstate water and EPA’s 
regulations include interstate waters in its definition of the 
“waters of the United States.” 40 CFR 122.2.  They also argue 
that the waters and wetlands in Wildman Marsh National 
13
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Wildlife Refuge are “waters of the United States” because the 
refuge is federal property and the water on it is therefore 
included in the “waters of the United States.”  The Supreme 
Court did not consider or reject these arguments in Rapanos.  The 
interstate nature of water pollution is the reason why Congress 
enacted water pollution control legislation in the first place. See, 
e.g., Act of Oct. 2, 1965, Pub. L. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903 (1965) 
(addressing water pollution only in interstate waters).  The 
argument that water on the federal wildlife preserve is water of 
the United States is true to the plain meaning of “waters of the 
United States” in the statute.  EPA’s definition of “waters of the 
United States” includes “tributaries” of waters of the United 
States. 40 CFR § 122.2.  This is a reasonable interpretation, 
because it would be difficult or impossible to prevent pollution of 
a navigable stream without preventing pollution of its tributaries, 
which are the origins of most of the water in the stream. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Bonhomme is not a proper plaintiff and his suit accordingly 
is dismissed without prejudice. Even if Bonhomme could 
maintain his suit, this Court would find for Maleau on all issues, 
except that Reedy Creek is a water of the United States.  This 
Court denies Bonhomme’s motion to dismiss because Progress 




DATED: July 23, 2012                                 Romulus N. Remus 
Progress City, Progress               United States District Judge 
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